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Abstract
To boost employees’ performance, firms often offer monetary bonuses when production
goals are reached. However, the evidence suggests that the particular level of a goal is
critical to the effectiveness of this practice. Goals must be challenging yet achievable.
Computing optimal goals when employees have private information about their own
abilities is often not feasible for the firm. To solve this problem, we propose a compen-
sation scheme in which workers set their own production goals. We provide a simple
model of self-chosen goals and test its predictions in the laboratory. The evidence we
find in the laboratory confirms our model’s predictions for men, but not for women.
Men exert greater effort under the self-chosen goal contract system than under a piece
rate contract. In contrast, women perform worse under the self-chosen goal contract.
Further analysis suggests that this is because women fail to set goals that are challeng-
ing enough, because they are less likely to update their goals to take into account their
improving performance as they repeat the task.
JEL: C91, C92, J16, J24.
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1 Introduction
Monetary bonuses for achieiving performance milestones are used to incentivize employees
in a wide range of industries, including finance, insurance, retailing (Banker et al., 2000),
manufacturing (Enis, 1993), energy services (Rajagopalan, 1996) and charities (Baber et al.,
2002). According to the last WorldatWork’s “Survey of Bonus Programs and Practices”
more than eighty percent of American firms use at least some type of bonus program
(WorldatWork, 2014).1 On average, American firms pay bonuses to their executives equal
to twenty-three percent of their base pay (WorldatWork, 2014).
The main theoretical rationale for bonuses is to stimulate performance. As long as
standard conditions on preferences and costs of effort hold, a monetary bonus works as
any pay-for-performance compensation: as the bonus increases, the effort exerted increases.
Empirically, a large number of studies have shown that bonuses are positively correlated
with employees’ performance (Groves et al., 1994; Baker et al., 1988; Banker et al., 2000;
Enis, 1993; Jones and Kato, 1995; Kahn and Sherer, 1990). Furthermore, beyond providing
monetary incentives, experiments also show that a bonus can also trigger gift-exchange con-
siderations and induce some agents to expend more effort than under an incentive contract
(Fehr et al. (2007)).
Typically, bonuses are awarded only if a certain performance target is reached. This
threshold feature can give this target level the status of a reference point. Thus, reference-or
goal-dependence can potentially be brought to bear to better understand the way bonuses
affect performance. There is evidence that once an individual has a goal, she may undertake
more effort on, exhibit greater persistence with, and direct more attention to, the endeavor
(Locke and Latham, 1990; Locke, 1996; Locke and Latham, 2002). However, there is also
evidence that the level of the goal is critical for its effectiveness: goals must be challenging
yet achievable. Goals that are too easy or too difficult to attain are not effective. Wu et al.
(2008) substantiate this intuition in a model, in which individuals respond to exogenously-
set goals. Their model predicts that performance is an inverted V-shaped function of the
goal level, implying that there is an optimal challenging yet attainable goal that will boost
performance to the maximum.
Computing optimal goals for employees is generally not feasible for a firm. If a principal
does not have perfect information about her employees’ abilities, choosing an optimal goal
is very difficult, if not impossible. To overcome this problem, we propose a compensation
scheme in which workers set their own production goals. With the right incentives, workers
set challenging goals that induce them to produce as much as they can, given their abilities.
This aligns the incentives of both employers and employees and solves the asymmetric
information problem.
In our system, the agent chooses her own goal from a menu that is prespecified by the
1According to Joseph and Kalwani (1998), 72% of the firms use bonuses to incentivize sales. See also
Lemieux et al. (2009) who document evidence on the increasing use of bonuses in the US labor market.
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principal. The proposed menu of contracts provides sufficient monetary incentives for the
agent to announce challenging yet attainable goals. The contract includes a monetary bonus
for achieving the goal, and this bonus increases monotonically with the magnitude of the
goal.2
In Section 2 we introduce a formal model of goal setting. The model builds on a standard
piece rate contract and considers the consequences of the addition of a bonus for achieving
a goal that is set by the agent himself. The model initially assumes preferences over only
monetary outcomes and effort. The model is then extended to include goal-dependent
preferences of a specific form, in which the goal serves as a reference point defining domains
of gains and losses (see Goerg and Kube (2012) and Gómez-Miñambres et al. (2012)).
The model yields a number of testable predictions. Agents increase their output as the
piece rate increases. They also increase their output if they are allowed to set their own
goal. Output always strictly exceeds the goal. This last prediction is a consequence of
goal-dependent preferences. In their absence, output is exactly equal to the goal.
As described in Section 3, we design a laboratory experiment to test the model’s predic-
tions. In the experiment, participants engage in a real effort task, which consists of counting
the number of zeros in a table with approximately 150 zeros and ones. Output is measured
as the number of tables completed correctly.3 We compare three contracts with regard to
the output they generate. Two of these are piece rate contacts: one with a relatively low
piece rate (LOPR) and another with a high piece rate (HIPR). The third contract is a self-
chosen goal contract (GOAL), which includes both a piece rate monetary compensation and
a monetary bonus that is paid if and only if a goal is reached. The novelty of this contract
is twofold. First, the size of the bonus increases monotonically with the goal, i.e. the higher
the production goal, the higher the monetary bonus paid if the bonus is achieved. In this
way, setting ambitious goals is incentivized monetarily. The second novel feature has to do
with who sets the goal. In our setting, rather a manager setting the goal for the worker, it
is the latter who sets the goal for himself.
The experimental results are reported in Section 4. We find that there are sharp gender
differences in the way in which subjects respond to the incentives of the contracts. First,
either allowing agents to set their own goals, or specifying more high-powered marginal
piece-rate incentives, induce men to produce higher output, as predicted by our model.
However, they do not have the same effect on women, whose output is unaffected by these
changes in compensation structure.
The gender differences observed in the lab cannot be explained by the model. However,
we find evidence of a plausible explanation of the gender effect. We observe that women
2There is evidence that people tend to overstate their abilities if the goal is not monetarily incentivized
(Goerg and Kube, 2012). This provides further justification for introducing monetary incentives in setting
self-chosen goals.
3This task has been previously used by other scholars in the literature. See for example Abeler et al.
(2011)
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are relatively conservative when setting their goals in that their actual performance tends
to exceed their goal by a larger margin than for men. Given that relatively modest goals
translate into smaller bonuses, the conservative goal setting has a cost in terms of earnings.
This behavior, in the first round, could be explained by greater risk aversion on the part
of women than men. However, thereafter, we observe that women insufficiently update
their goals as they gain experience, failing to internalize the trend of improvement in their
performance. Male subjects, in contrast, tend to increase their goals from one period to
the next, and thus tend, to a greater extent than women, to internalize and anticipate the
learning acquired in the task over time. The consequence is lower goal setting on the part
of females and therefore lower earnings in the set-your-own-goal condition.
Our paper is intended to contribute to several strands of literature. First, it contributes
to the literature on mechanism design, originating in the work of Hurwicz (1973) and
Mirrlees (1976), by offering a contract in which an incentive compatible elicitation of a
production goal aligns the incentives of both principal and agent. Our contract allows the
agent to self-select into a bonus scheme that is well-suited to her particular individual cost
profile of effort. In this manner, the choice of one’s own goal resembles the choice of one
own linear contract (Laffont, 1994), by adapting the marginal incentives in the contract to
the agents’ type, increasing the payoff to both worker and employer.
Second, it adds to the literature on personnel economics (see Prendergast (1999) for
a review) by proposing a novel pay-for-performance incentive scheme. There is a large
literature on performance-payment schemes (e.g. Lazear (1986), Lazear (2000)) and bonus
contracts, (Fehr et al., 1998, 2007), but the type of bonuses that this literature studies are
exclusively those exogenously set by the firm.
Third, the paper contributes to the literature on goals as performance enhancers started
by Locke (1996) and continued by Heath et al. (1999). This literature argues that goals act
as reference points, and due to the properties of the prospect theory value function, they
boost performance. Wu et al. (2008) show this intuition in a model in which individuals
respond to exogenously-set goals. Gómez-Miñambres (2012) and Gómez-Miñambres et al.
(2012) develop this idea further. Our extension is to endogenize the goals. Wu et al. (2008)
and Gómez-Miñambres et al. (2012) show that under perfect information, an optimizing
principal chooses a challenging but attainable goal for an average-ability worker, and that
this optimal goal increases worker’s performance.4
Gómez-Miñambres et al. (2012) test the predictions of their model in the laboratory,
and to ensure that participants who act as principals have the right information about the
average performance of workers, they choose participants who have previous experience in
performing the task themselves. While the protocol of Gómez-Miñambres et al. (2012) for
creating familiarity with the task on the part of the principal is feasible in the laboratory, it
4Gómez-Miñambres (2012) also studies a principal-agent model, where the principal sets a goal for the
agent, and the agent derives a sense of pride from accomplishing the goal. They show that the agent’s
production and the goal set by the principal both increase with the agent’s personal standards.
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may not be practical to apply in many organizations, where managers may not be able to
have hands-on experience with the task workers have to perform. In such contexts, asking
the manager to set challenging but attainable goals for each worker may be a difficult task.5
Fourth, a number of recent theoretical papers (e.g., Koch and Nafziger (2011), Koch and
Nafziger and Hsiaw (2013)) have considered the effects of endogenous goals in attenuating
self-control problems in other contexts. Like us, they assume that goals are endogenous
reference points and that agents are loss averse. Our paper differs from this literature
in two distinct ways. First, in this literature the goals are not incentivized with money.
Second, the focus is on decision problems where time plays a key role. The key insight in
this literature is that an increase in the goal level set today raises an individual’s motivation
to work hard in the future. If the individual has present bias, he may be tempted to shirk
in the future. However, if he is sophisticated enough, he can use a goal as a self-motivating
device to attenuate future shirking. The role that a goal plays in this paper is different.
Present bias is not a factor in our model because we work in a static framework and the
motivation to set a goal emerges directly from the incentives of the contract. The individual
sets an optimal goal in order to maximize his earnings.
The paper closest to ours is Goerg and Kube (2012), who report an experiment that
includes a treatment in which workers are paid a bonus conditional on reaching a pre-
specified self-chosen goal. However, their contract is different from ours in at least two
important respects. First, it doesn’t include the piece rate payment. They offer a fixed
payment plus a bonus if the goal is reached, so workers have no monetary incentives to
continue working once the goal is reached. Second, they consider a one shot setting. Our
experimental protocol, in contrast, is a multi-period setting in which the worker can update
his knowledge about his ability, allowing him to adapt his goal levels accordingly. With
our design, we are able to study not only how self-chosen goals boost workers’ performance,
but also the dynamics of self-chosen goals in a context in which the worker learns about
his ability. As Latham and Locke (1991) argue, goal setting is most effective when there is
feedback showing progress in relation to the goal.
2 The model
In this section, we develop a theoretical framework for the analysis of self-chosen goals from
which we derive the predictions that we test in the laboratory. We use elements of Gómez-
Miñambres et al. (2012)’s theoretical framework, in which the principal chooses an optimal
goal for the agent. However, in our model we study the case in which the principal leaves
the decision of setting a goal and producing output entirely to the agent.
5The challenge is further complicated by the fact that workers themselves have differing abilities and
interact with each other. If the manager sets a goal based on his perception of each worker’s ability, then
a goal becomes a signal which can itself be an extra motivator if the signal is good enough, as in Benabou
and Tirole (2003). However, it can also be discouraging if it is low relative to the signal received by other
workers, or to one’s expectations about one’s own ability.
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Consider an agent who chooses a level of production y ≥ 0. The cost of production is
increasing and convex, and for simplicity we assume c(y) = (y/θ)
2
2 . The parameter 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1
is interpreted as the agent’s ability. We assume that θ is known by the agent.
2.1 The case of goal-independent preferences
We first consider the standard case of an agent with goal-independent preferences. Suppose
the agent faces a piece rate compensation w(y) = αy, where α is the compensation for each
unit of output. Her utility is thus:
U(y) = αy − (y/θ)
2
2 . (1)
Choosing y to maximize U(y), the agent sets the optimal output under a piece rate contract
y∗p = θ2α.
Suppose now that in addition to the piece rate compensation, the principal introduces
a bonus B for attaining an exogenously given output goal g. In that case, the payoff of the
agent is given by
w(y,B(y, g)) = αy +B(y, g), (2)
where we assume a bonus of the form:
B(y, g) =
βg if y ≥ g0 if y < g. (3)
β > 0 is a parameter indicating the monetary compensation for reaching the goal g. The
employer gives a larger bonus when he requires a more ambitious goal, and the bonus is not
awarded if the target level of output is not attained.
Under such a bonus scheme, the worker must choose whether to work toward the bonus
or not. Thus, he must compare the payoff from the optimal level of output below the target
level with that resulting from equaling or exceeding such target level. The optimal choice of
production in the region below the target maximizes the utility function within that region.
Denote the optimal output in this region as y, and the resulting utility level as
U(y) = αy −
(y/θ)2
2 . (4)
Similarly, the optimal output in the region of output above or equal the target level is equal
to y, and the corresponding utility level is
U(y) = αy + βg − (y/θ)
2
2 . (5)
It is optimal not to try to achieve the goal, that is U(y, g) > U(y, g), when the goal is set
so high that it becomes too costly to attain. This is the case when y > y and the marginal
5
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the worker exerts extra effort to attain the goal beyond the amount she would have exerted
if there were no bonus in place. Therefore, a challenging and achievable exogenously set
goal has the potential to increase output.
Generically, however, the principal will not have perfect information about the type of
the worker. Hence, he will not know the level at which he should set his production goal.
For this reason, we consider the case in which the worker can set her own goal. We model
the goal and effort as set simultaneously. The following proposition characterizes the opti-
mal choice of goal and output level made by the agent. We show that when the worker can
choose her own goal, she will set it at the optimal level of output, and she will then work
exactly as much as it is needed to achieve her goal.
Proposition 1: The agent chooses a goal equal to g∗ = (α+β)θ2 and exerts output y∗ = g∗.
Proof. We first show that at an optimum, it must be the case that the optimal output level
is equal to the optimal goal chosen, i.e. y∗ = g∗. Second, we show that g∗ = θ2(α+ β).
First we show that if y 6= g, either y or g is not optimal. Consider a given yl such that
yl < g. Then U(yl, g) = αyl− (yl/θ)
2
2 . By reducing her goal and setting g = yl the agent can
achieve a strictly greater payoff U(yl, yl) = αyl− (yl/θ)
2
2 +βyl. Now consider a given yh such
that g < yh. The agent’s payoff is U(yh, g) = αyh − (yh/θ)
2
2 + βg. Then, by increasing the
goal to g = yh, the agents’ payoff increases to U(yh, yh) = αyh − (yh/θ)
2
2 + βyh. Therefore,
y∗ must be equal to g.
The second step is to derive the optimal goal. By the first step of the proof, we know
that the agent will always work exactly as much as needed to receive the bonus. If so, her
earnings are given by (α+ β)g − (y/θ)
2
2 = (α+ β)y −
(y/θ)2
2 . To derive the optimal goal, we
consider the first order condition for the maximization of earnings with respect to output,
y∗ = (α+ β)θ2, which directly implies the optimal goal, g∗ = θ2(α+ β).
The optimal output level for both the piece rate and the self-chosen goal contracts are
illustrated in Figure 1. The diagonal line indicates the marginal cost of output, y
θ2 , with
slope 1
θ2 . The horizontal lines represent the marginal benefit of output under each contract.
Under a standard piece rate contract, the marginal benefit expressed in terms of output
is αθ2. Under the endogenous bonus contract, the marginal benefit expressed in terms of
output is (α + β)2.6 From the figure, it is clear that increasing the piece rate α or adding
6An analogy that is perhaps useful in understanding Figure 1 is to long-run and short-run costs in
producer theory. In the short-run,the quantity of labor employed can be changed, and in the long run, the
amount of capital can be adjusted as well. Here, we can consider the choice of output as a factor that can






























Figure 1: Optimal Output
a self-chosen bonus increases effort and thus output.
2.2 Goal-dependent preferences
Now suppose that the worker has goal-dependent preferences (Heath et al., 1999; Wu et al.,
2008), which are represented by the following utility function:
U(y, g) = VE(y,B(y, g)) + VI(y, g)−
(y/θ)2
2 . (6)
The first term VE(y,B(y, g)) = w(y,B) = αy+B(g, y) represents the utility the worker
gets from receiving the monetary compensation. The second term represents the intrinsic
(non-monetary) utility from attaining the goal (as in Kőszegi and Rabin (2006), or Gómez-
Miñambres et al. (2012)). We assume that VI satisfies the properties of the value function
of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)), and it is defined as follows:
VI(y, g) =
{
(y − g)1/2 if y ≥ g
−λ(−(y − g))1/2 if y < g.
(7)
The goal g acts as a reference point dividing the output space into gains, where the goal
is attained or exceeded, and losses, where the goal is not attained. The parameter λ > 1
line at α + β in Figure 1 represents a long run marginal payoff function, the upper envelope of short-run
payoff functions for different fixed goal levels.
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measures the degree of loss aversion. Because the exponent of (y − g) is less than one, the
function VI also satisfies diminishing sensitivity. It is concave in the domain of gains and
convex on the domain of losses.
Taking these conditions into account, the overall utility of the worker can be summarized
as follows:
U(y, g) =
 αy + βg + (y − g)1/2 −
(y/θ)2
2 , if y ≥ g.
αy − λ(−(y − g))1/2 − (y/θ)
2
2 , if y < g.
(8)
The goal enters the utility function in two ways. On one hand, it enters positively as
a conditional monetary bonus that is increasing in the magnitude of the goal. For this
reason, the worker prefers higher to lower goals, provided that the higher goal is attainable.
Furthermore, the goal divides the output space into psychological loss and gain domains.
Due to loss aversion (λ > 1), the marginal utility of output in the loss domain is higher
than in the gain domain for a given absolute difference from the goal. Strict concavity in
the domain of losses encourages the agent to work harder as she approaches her goal. The
cost of effort, together with the ability of the worker and his degree of loss aversion, all
influence the optimal goal for a particular worker.7
Before we define the optimal choice of goal and output level of a worker with goal-
dependent preferences, we note that given the strict convexity of the marginal utility func-
tion in the domain of losses and the linearity of the marginal cost of effort, it is possible to
have multiple output levels {y1, y2, ..., yn}, in which the marginal utility equals the marginal
cost of effort, for a given goal. We assume that the agent stops working at lowest effort
level, i.e. yk = min{y1, y2, ..., yn}, at which one of the first order conditions (9) or (10),
and the appropriate second order sufficient condition for a local optimum, ∂
2U(y,g)
∂2y < 0 is
satisfied.
We now proceed to derive the optimal effort. Given the functional form of the utility
function and its discontinuity at the reference point, we distinguish between two cases.
Case 1 is when current output is below the goal and case 2 is when it exceeds the goal.
Maximization of (8) for a given g leads to the following first order conditions.
∂U(y, g)
∂y
= α+ 12(y − g)
− 12 − y
θ2
= 0, if y > g. (9)
∂U(y, g)
∂y
= α+ λ2 (g − y)
− 12 − y
θ2
= 0, if y < g. (10)
Equation (9) applies to the case in which y > g and equation ( 10) governs the case when
7In the model of Gómez-Miñambres et al. (2012), the goal enters the utility function only through a
psychological payoff. We also allow the goal to enter the utility function as a monetary bonus for two main
reasons. First, although non-binding goals are interesting on their own, in this paper we want to focus
on goals which yield monetary bonuses, since they are common practice in firms. Second, we wanted to






























Figure 2: Output y∗∗ when the goal is optimal g∗∗
y < g. Note that because we assume loss aversion (i.e. λ > 1), failing to reach a goal by a
given amount is more costly than the benefit of surpassing the goal by the same amount.
In addition, output increases with the difficulty of the goal as long as the goal is attained
or surpassed (i.e. y > g)8. However, effort decreases with goal difficulty conditional on the
goal not being attained (i.e. y < g) 9. In other words, goals and effort are complements in
the domain of gains but substitutes in the domain of losses. This captures the idea that
an agent’s output is increasing in the level of the goal when it is attainable. It also implies
that a challenging but attainable goal works better than goals that are either too easy or
too difficult.10
From Figure 2, we see that the marginal utility of output is increasing when the goal
is not reached, decreasing once the goal is reached, and tends to infinitity asymptotically
as the goal is approached. This particular inverted-V shape of the marginal utility is due
to two reasons. First, the goal acts as a reference point, dividing the space of outcomes
into gains and losses. The second is diminishing sensitivity, in that the utility function is
concave over gains but convex over losses.
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Figure 4: Output yL when the goal is too low gL
10
be detrimental to performance. Under such a goal, the agent will only produce output
yH . Beyond that level, marginal cost of effort exceeds marginal utility, which is relatively
low due to the overambitious goal. Figure 4 illustrates that goals that are set too low
are also counterproductive. The agent experiences an opportunity cost in terms of utility
whenever he sets a goal that is not challenging enough, because the marginal utility of
output decreases rapidly after the goal is attained.
Suppose that the agent sets the optimal goal from her perspective. We calculate this
optimum in three steps. We first show that, at an optimum, (10) must be satisfied by the
goal which induces a point of tangency between the marginal utility and the marginal cost
of output, as shown in Figure 2. This condition is similar to those derived in Wu et al.
(2008) and Gómez-Miñambres et al. (2012). Then, we use this condition to compute the
optimal goal. Finally, we calculate the optimal output and show that it exceeds the optimal
goal.
We first prove Lemma 1 that shows that there is only one goal that satisfies (10) at a
point of tangency:
Lemma 1: There exists an unique goal ĝ such that ∂
2(VE(y,ĝ)+VI(y,B))
∂y∂g = 1/θ
2 with an as-
sociated output level ŷ(ĝ) that satisfies (10).
Proof. The (a) strict convexity of ∂(VE(y,B)+VI(y,g))∂y with respect to y in the region y < g,
indicated in (10) and illustrated in Figure 2, (b) the continuity of VI(y, g) with respect to
g in (10) and (c) the property that ∂
2(VE(y,B)+VI(y,g)
∂y∂g < 0 in (10), ensure that there is an
unique level curve in the domain of losses ∂(VE(y,B)+VI(y,ĝ))∂y , for an unique goal ĝ, that yields
a point of tangency with respect to y/θ2.
Strict convexity ensures that that any goal g generates at most one point of tangency.
Continuity ensures that there exists at least one goal g that has a point of tangency, since
as g varies continuously, (10) does not change discontinuously. The uniqueness of the goal
level ĝ that generates a point of tangency is guaranteed by ∂
2(VE(y,g)+VI(y,B))
∂y∂g < 0 in (10),
which indicates that the marginal utility is strictly monotonically decreasing in g for any
given value of y. In other words, as g increases, the marginal utility function moves in a
strictly south-easterly direction.
We now show that the goal ĝ that generates the point of tangency is the optimal goal,
which we denote as g∗∗.11 We will require the following assumption.
Assumption 1: For all g′ and y′, such that g′ < ĝ, y′ < ŷ, g′ < y′ and ĝ < ŷ hold, the
following inequality also holds:
11We denote the optimal goal under reference dependence as g∗∗ to distinguish it from g∗, the optimal





2 < α(ŷ − y
′) + β(ĝ − g′) + λ[(g′ − y′)1/2 − (ĝ − ŷ)1/2] (11)
This condition is a requirement that α, β and λ, for which higher values motivate greater
output, be sufficiently large relative to the marginal cost of output. This condition ensures
that monetary incentives in the worker’s contract are sufficiently powerful so that the utility
from achieving the goal is not the dominant motivation. It requires that the benefit from
reducing one’s goal from an optimal level g∗∗ to a lower level g′ not exceed the costs of




2 , and the costs are in
terms of lost piece rate wages α(ŷ − y′), foregone bonus β(ĝ − g′) and lost intrinsic utility
VI(y′, g′)−VI(ŷ, ĝ), which equals λ[(g′−y′)1/2−(ĝ− ŷ)1/2. We are now in a position to prove
Proposition 2, which characterizes the optimal goal under reference-dependent preferences.
Proposition 2: Suppose that an agent has the preferences given in equation (8). Then,
the optimal goal g∗∗ satisfies





and the optimal output y∗∗ satisfies






Proof. We first show that a goal that specifies g > ĝ is not optimal. Consider an individual
who sets g′′ > ĝ. Recall that we maintain the assumption that the agent will stop exerting
effort in the first instance for which the marginal cost of output exceeds the marginal utility
of output. Let ŷ satisfy Lemma 1 and consider y′′ > ŷ. By the strict convexity and
monotonicity of (10) in g, we have that c(y′′)− c(ŷ) > VE(y′′, (g′′) +VI(y′′, (g′′)−VE(ŷ, ĝ) +
VI(ŷ, ĝ). This results in strictly lower earnings that under goal ĝ. Figure 3 illustrates the
consequences of setting a goal gH , that is higher than optimal.
We now show that it is also not optimal to set g < ĝ. Consider an individual who sets
g′′ < ĝ. She then reduces her piece rate compensation by α(ŷ−y′′). She further reduces her
bonus, since she has now attained a less ambitious goal, by β(ĝ − g′′). By shifting the goal
to the left, she also loses VI(y′, g′)− VI(ŷ, ĝ) = λ[(g′− y′)1/2− (ĝ− ŷ)1/2 . On the hand the




2 . However, Assumption 1
guarantees that U((y′′), g′′) < U((ŷ), ĝ). The outcome resulting from setting a goal that is
too low, gL, is shown in Figure 4.
We have thus shown that the optimal goal g∗∗ = ĝ. Calculating the optimal goal for our
parameters, we have, differentiating (10) with respect to g,
θλ
4 (ŷ − g)




Solving for g∗∗, we obtain the expression in (12). The production level y∗∗ associated with
the optimal goal level is found using (12) to solve (9), which yields the solution in (13).
Figure 2 shows the optimal goal level and its associated production level. From the figure
it is evident that the optimal production level exceeds the optimal goal. This is a result
of the assumption of reference dependence, since it does not occur if such dependence is
not assumed. Thus, under reference dependence, performance will exceed the goal, though
perhaps only by a modest amount.
From (12) it is clear that the optimal goal is strictly positive and bounded above. The
model also generates the following comparative statics. First, an increase in the piece rate
increases the optimal goal (∂g
∗∗
∂α > 0) and the optimal output (
∂y∗∗
∂α > 0), as in the case of
no reference dependence. Second, greater loss aversion leads to higher goals ( ∂g
∗∗
∂λ > 0) and
more output. The higher the ability level θ, the higher the goal (∂g
∗∗
∂θ > 0). Furthermore, it
is straightforward to show that dy
∗∗
dg∗∗ > 0.
12 Thus, if agents are behaving optimally, output
increases with higher goals. For a given cost profile, increasing α, λ or θ increases the
optimal goal and consequently the resulting production level.
3 The experiment
3.1 The general setting
Our dataset consists of 25 sessions. The sessions were conducted at the CentERLab in
Tilburg University and all of the subjects were students at the university. We used Z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) to implement the experiment. Subjects were recruited via an
online system. On average each session lasted approximately one hour. Between five and
eighteen subjects took part in each session. No subject participated more than once in the
experiment. The currency used in the experiment was Euros. A total of 232 subjects took
part in the experiment.
In the experiment, subjects performed a time consuming real effort task under either a
self-chosen goal incentive scheme or a piece rate incentive scheme, as described in Section
2. The real effort task was the one employed by Abeler et al. (2011), which consisted of
counting the number of zeros in tables composed of 150 randomly ordered zeros and ones.
The task was unfamiliar to all participants. It entailed a cost of effort in terms of attention
and patience. In addition, the output of the task was of no use for the experimenter so that
the impact of any social preferences with regard to the experimenter were minimized.
Each session was divided into nine five-minute periods. A subject’s performance in
each period counted toward her earnings. There were three treatments, called Self-chosen














,thus it is clear that 0 < dy
∗∗
dg∗∗ < 1,
given that (y∗∗ − g∗∗) > 0.
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goal (GOAL hereafter), Low piece rate (LOPR) and High piece rate (HIPR). Thirty-nine
subjects participated in LOPR, 93 in HIPR, and 100 in GOAL. The differences between
the treatments are described in the following subsection. We use LOPR as the benchmark
of comparison against which we evaluate the two other treatments.
3.2 The Three Treatments
In the GOAL treatment, subjects had to choose a target level of corrected solved tasks per
round g the beginning of each period. Achieving that goal would yield a monetary bonus
B, increasing in the goal level at a rate β = 20 (20 Eurocents). That is, setting the goal
one successfully completed unit of the task higher yielded 20 cents more, conditional of the
goal being attained. In addition to the bonus if reached, subjects receive a piece rate of
α = 20 (20 Eurocents) per correctly solved table or unit of output y. The payoff function
of a participant assigned to this treatment in each round was
wGOAL = 20 · y − 20 · b13 ic+B(g, y), (15)
with
B(g, y) =
20 · g if y ≤ g0 if y > g. (16)
For every third incorrectly solved table, i, a participant had 20 cents subtracted from her
earnings. This punishment was introduced to reduce guessing on the part of participants,
as well as to capture a situation in which there is a cost to the worker of making errors,
such as for example producing defective units of output.
In the LOPR treatment, subjects were paid a constant piece rate of α = 20 (20 Euro-
cents) for each unit of output. A penalty of 20 cents for every third incorrectly solved table
was also in effect. The per-period payoff function of a participant assigned to this treatment
was the following:
wLOPR = 20 · y − 20 · b13 ic (17)
The HIPR treatment was identical to LOPR except that subjects received a piece rate of
α = 50 (50 cents) for each unit of output. The per-period payoff function in this treatment
was:
wHIPR = 50 · y − 50 · b13 ic (18)
Similarly to under the LOPR treatment, for every third incorrectly solved table, a partici-
pant had 50 cents subtracted from her earnings.
Figure 5 illustrates the incentives in effect in each treatment. The horizontal axis indi-
cates the number of units of output, and the compensation a participant receives is given on
14
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Figure 5: Incentives by treatment
the vertical axis. The figure shows that for any level of production, the earnings associated
with HIPR always dominate the payments associated to LOPR and GOAL. In turn, the
earnings in GOAL weakly dominate those of LOPR for any output profile.
4 Results
We first consider differences in output between the GOAL, LOPR and HIPR contracts.
In order to do so, we estimate the following Poisson count regression of output, measured
as the number of correctly solved tables, on the treatment dummies, some demographic
characteristics (domestic or foreign student and program of study) and period dummies.
Correctrsj = β0 + β1 ·HIPRj + β2 ·GOALj + Γ′Controlsrsj + εrsj (19)
Correctrsj denotes the number of correctly solved tables by subject j in round r of
session s. As Table 1 shows, when we consider the whole sample, the different contracts
do not seem to affect output significantly. However, when we split the sample by men
and women, the gender differences become clear. According to Table 1 and Figure 6, men
increase their output by a roughly similar proportion, compared to the reference condition





















 95% C.I. 
Female
Figure 6: Predicted output by condition and gender
own goal, under GOAL.
Under HIPR, men’s output is on average 23% higher than under LOPR, (p=0.052).
The GOAL contract, in turn, yields higher output on the part of male participants by 29%
on average compared to LOPR (p<0.01). There is no significant difference in performance
between the HIPR and GOAL for male participants (χ2(1)=0.19, p=0.664). Hence, if the
goal of the employer is to increase male workers’ performance, she would be better off im-
posing either the HIPR or the GOAL contract than under LOPR. Each of the high-powered
contracts would result in more output relative to the low-powered piece rate contract, with
the GOAL contract inducing even higher performance at lower cost than HIPR.
The results are very different for women. Both relatively high-powered incentive con-
tracts, the HIPR and the GOAL, generate lower average output than LOPR. Under HIPR,
women’s output is on average 13 % lower than under LOPR, ceteris paribus, (p=0.062).
GOAL also decreases output by 33 % on average compared to LOPR (p<0.001). Women’s
performance in the HIPR or GOAL is about the same (χ2( 1)=4.17, p=0.041). Thus from
the point of view of the employer whose target is to increase a female worker’s output, both
increasing the piece rate or imposing a goal contract would be counterproductive.
We summarize this discussion of the gender differences on the effect of incentive change
on effort as our first result.
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Result 1 (Gender differences in output): The GOAL and the HIPR contracts yield
more production from men, but lower output from women, than under LOPR.
Table 1: Determinants of Output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Sample Male Sample Female Sample
Correct Correct Correct Correct Correct Correct
HIPR -0.003 -0.009 0.210 0.227∗ -0.137 -0.164∗
(0.064) (0.063) (0.108) (0.109) (0.073) (0.071)
GOAL -0.100 -0.130∗ 0.260∗∗ 0.222∗ -0.334∗∗∗ -0.355∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.066) (0.094) (0.093) (0.085) (0.085)
constant 1.451∗∗∗ 1.137∗∗∗ 1.256∗∗∗ 0.908∗∗∗ 1.571∗∗∗ 1.289∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.051) (0.060) (0.079) (0.040) (0.062)
Demographics NO YES NO YES NO YES
Round dummies NO YES NO YES NO YES
Session FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 1926 1926 927 927 999 999
Pseudo Log-likelihood -3967.658 -3889.242 -1910.538 -1870.165 -2011.267 -1974.703
Note: This table presents estimations of the model Correctrjs = β0+β1 ·HIPRj+β2 ·GOALj+Γ′Controlsrjs+εrjs with εrjs ∼ poisson(µ)
and Controlsrjs contains session dummies, round dummies and demographic variables such as Dutch nationality, following studies related to
economics and degree level. All estimations used Poisson count data regressions and robust standard errors, which are presented in parentheses.
Regression (1) are the estimates excluding session dummies and demographic variables . Regression (2) are the estimates of the complete
model. Regression (3) are the estimates of the model excluding demographics and the period dummies when the sample is composed of male
subjects. Regression (4) are the estimates of the complete model when the sample is uniquely composed of male subjects. Regression (5) are
the estimates of the model excluding demographics and the period dummies when the sample is composed of female subjects. Regression (6)
presents the estimates of the complete model when the sample is composed by female subjects. *** denotes significance at the 0.1 percent
level,** denotes significance at the 1 percent level and * denotes significance at the 5 percent level.
We compare the genders to each other with regard to their output by estimating the
following model using a Poisson count regression.
Correctrjs = β0 + β1 ·HIPRj + β2 ·GOALj + β3 ·HIPRj · gender + β4 ·GOALj · gender
+β5gender + Γ′Controls+ εrjs
(20)
As Table 2 and Figure 6 show, women produce more output (approximately 36% more
correct tables) than men under the low piece rate contract (p<0.001). In contrast, men
produce more output than women when the piece rate is higher HIPR (χ2(1)= 7.31, p<0.01)
and when they face the GOAL contract (χ2(1) = 17.14 ,p<0.001).
In Section 2, we showed that if agents have reference-dependent preferences, they will
outperform their goals, though perhaps by only a small amount. This is precisely what we
observe in the GOAL treatment. While the average output was 4.09 tables per period, the
average goal level was 3.75. This gap of 0.35 tables is statistically significant (t(809)=-5.35,
p<0.001) and relatively small (performance being only 9% higher than the goal). The pat-
tern was present for both women and men. The gap between output and goals is always
positive, although it only becomes statistically significant from the third round onward.
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HIPR· gender -0.347∗∗ -0.391∗∗
(0.131) (0.130)







Round dummies NO YES
Session FE YES YES
N 1926 1926
Pseudo Log-Likelihood -3921.805 -3844.867
Note: This table presents estimations of the model Correctrjs = β0 + β1 ·
HIPRj+β2 ·GOALj+β3 ·HIPRj ·gender+β4 ·GOALj ·gender+β5gender+
Γ′Controlsrjs+εrjs with εrjs ∼ poisson(µ) and Controlsrjs contains session
dummies, round dummies and demographic variables such as Dutch nationality,
following studies related to economics and degree level. All regressions used
poisson count data regressions and robust standard errors, which are presented
in parentheses. Regression (1) presents the estimates of the model excluding
demographic and round dummies. Regression (2) presents the estimates of the
complete model. gender = 1 if the subject is a female. *** denotes significance
at the 0.1 percent level,** denotes significance at the 1 percent level and *
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Figure 7: Average output minus goal in each round
The increase in the difference between output and goals with experience suggests that the
difference is not due to risk aversion, since it can be presumed that beliefs about one’s own
performance become more precise with practice. This would mean that an agent with a
given level of risk aversion, in the absence of other effects, would exhibit a decreasing excess
of output over his goal with experience. The empirical pattern shown in Figure 7 suggests
that the piling up effect is a feature of long-run behavior. This discussion is summarized as
our second result.
Result 2 (Piling-up): Subjects tend to outperform their goals. The difference between
goals and output does not decrease with repetition.
As predicted by the model, we also observe a positive correlation between the goal level
and effort (ρcorrectj ,goalj=0.4437,p<0.01). Notably, this positive relationship appears when
the goal lies in an intermediate range, where the goals are presumably challenging and
attainable. More precisely, when goals are very high (g > 7) the correlation between effort
and goal level is not significant and possibly even negative. Figure 8 displays a graphical
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Figure 8: The relation between goal level and output
5 Understanding the Gender Differences
The model predicts that the GOAL contract increases workers’ output. While we observe
this effect for men, we find exactly the opposite for women. Women produce significantly
less under the self-chosen goal contract, even compared to a contract that offers less money
in expected terms. In this section, we investigate potential reasons for the gender difference,
and we report evidence suggesting that the main reason seems to be that women system-
atically underestimate their potential, because they do not take into account the fact that
their performance improves with practice.
Women set significantly lower goals than men (See Table 3).13 This effect is present in all
nine rounds of the experiment. Moreover, we observe that the extent to which performance
exceeds goals is greater for women than for men. Women outperform their goals by a 0.29
tasks more than what men do (p<0.05).
Is this evidence suggesting that women do not set challenging enough goals? Although
we do not know the actual maximum potential of individuals to perform in the task, the
potential of women is not likely to be lower than that of men, since we observe that women
perform better than men under the baseline LOPR contract. If anything, we would expect
women to set higher goals than men. However, the fact that we observe the contrary,
13The average goal set by women is roughly half of a table lower than that set by men (p<0.001).
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Table 3: Average Behavior by Gender in GOAL
Gender Goal Margin Prob. Achiev. Goal (1st round)
Male 4.049 .2380 .739 4.204
(1.395) (1.862) (.439) (1.925)
Female 3.557 .527 .773 3.352
(1.246) (1.694) (.419) (1.230)
Total 3.798 .385 .756 3.77
(1.343) (1.783) (.4293) (1.656)
Note: This table presents the averages and standard deviations of goal levels, the difference be-
tween the goal level and the produced output, the probability of achievement of the self-chosen
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Figure 9: Goal setting as reaction to success or failure by gender
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suggests that women set goals that are not challenging enough. Moreover, because the
monetary bonus is strictly increasing in the goal chosen, setting goals below one’s own
potential is costly in terms of foregone earnings.
The question that follows is why women set goals that are suboptimally low. Two
candidate explanations are that the pattern is due to women having (1) lower self-efficacy
beliefs, or (2) greater risk aversion. In fact, empirical evidence shows that women exhibit
systematically lower general self-efficacy than men (Scholz et al., 2002) and are more risk
averse (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Eckel and Grossman, 2008).14 However, while self-efficacy
and risk aversion can explain initial low goals for females, they cannot explain the fact that
women set low goals systematically over the course of the nine periods, even after they have
the chance to update their beliefs with full information about their own performance.
We consider gender differences in the way individuals update their goals in response
to their performance and goal level in the previous period, by estimating the following
regression.15 16
log(g)jr = θ0 + θ1 · log(g)j,r−1 + θ2 ·max(0, gj,r−1 − yj,r−1)+
θ3 ·max(0, yj,r−1 − gj,r−1) + Γ′Controlsj + νjr
(21)
Table 4 presents the Arellano-Bond estimation of this model. The estimates show that
men and women adopt the same adjustment behaviour in reaction to success or failure to
reach their goals. They both decrease their goal (by 8%) after failing to achieve their goal
(χ2(1)=0.29, p=0.587) and increase their goal (by 7 %) (χ2(1)= 0.80, p=0.3719) when the
previous period’s goal is achieved. However, in addition, men exhibit an increasing trend in
the goals they set. On average, the per round rate of goal growth for the male subsample
(before the effect of prior success and failure to reach the goal in the last period is taken
into account) is 41.5%. However, there is no evidence of a trend in goal setting for women.
These empirical observations can be summarized in the following result.
14Self-efficacy is the extent of one’s belief in one’s own ability to complete a task and reach a goal (Bandura
(1977); Bandura and Cervone (1986)). Self-efficacy can be conceptualized as either general or task-specific.
General self-efficacy represents an optimistic general sense of personal competence. The task-specific type
represents one’s perceived beliefs about competence in a particular domain. For example, females tend to
exhibit higher language self-efficacy than males, but lower mathematical self-efficacy (Huang, 2013). In our
experimental setting, we can interpret the goal level as a measure of subjects’ self-efficacy. This is possible
because the elicitation of the goal is incentivized monetarily in such a way that a rational subject would
announce what she believes is close to the highest production level that she can achieve. As we have seen,
the higher the belief in her ability to perform the task (i.e. the higher the self-efficacy), the higher the goal
that the person will announce.
15Note that this specification allows for the possibility that the goal is updated asymmetrically in response
to success or failure.
16Including only a one-period lag in the goal setting process has a better fit than models including lags of
two or more periods.
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Table 4: Determinants of Goal Setting
(1) (2) (3)
Total Sample Male Female
Goal (Present round) Goal (Present round) Goal(Present round)
Goal (lag round) (log(gs,r−1)) 0.343∗ 0.415∗∗ 0.189
(0.138) (0.154) (0.167)
Success (lag round) (max(0, yj,r−1 − gj,r−1)) 0.068∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.014) (0.014)




Constant 0.821∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗ 0.953∗∗∗
(0.175) (0.193) (0.189)
Demographics YES YES YES
N 630 308 322
Note: This table presents the Arellano Bond Panel Data estimation of the modellog(g)jr = θ0 +θ1 · log(g)j,t−1 +θ2 ·max(0, gj,t−1−yj,t−1)+θ3 ·
max(0, yj,t−1 − gj,t−1) + β1 · gender+ Γ′Controlsj + νjr with Controls containing demographic variables such as Dutch nationality and degree
level. All regressions used robust standard errors which are presented in parentheses. Regression (1) presents the estimation of this model using
the whole sample. Regression (2) presents the estimation of this model using male subjects. Regression (3) presents the estimation of the model
using female subjects . *** denotes significance at the 0.1 percent level,** denotes significance at the 1 percent level and * denotes significance at
the 5 percent level.
Result 3 (Gender Differences in Goal Setting): Both men and women tend to in-
crease their goals after successfully attaining them and decrease their goals after failing to
do so. However, controlling for these effects, men tend to increase their goals over time,
while women do not.
This systematic failure to internalize the trend of improvement in performance comes at
a cost for women. They earn on average 0.87 euros less than men in our experiment. They
could have earned on average 7.5% more money had they set and updated their goals in a
similar manner to men.17 Women’s underperformance under a self-chosen goal contract is
essentially explained by their failure to update their goals upwards, even when they learn
that they can perform better than what they initially thought. Their goals remain low
even when it is monetarily costly, and when all the information needed to change them is
available.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies the properties, both theoretical and behavioral, of a compensation
scheme in which agents set their own production goals. We first proposed a model in
17This result is not minor, considering, for example, that the gender gap in earnings in the United States
for workers between 19-24 years old (the age of the subjects in our sample) is about 9% (US Department of
Labor, 2010).
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which goals assume the role of endogenous reference points. We then test the model’s
predictions with a laboratory experiment. We observe (a) evidence for pilling-up, that is,
subjects systematically outperform their goals, but only by a small amount, and (b) that
goals do motivate greater effort, at least on the part of male participants.
However, the effectiveness of the self-chosen goal incentive scheme depends crucially
on the gender of the worker. While the self-chosen goal contract makes men increase
their production compared to a low piece rate contract, it is counterproductive for women.
Women produce significantly less under the self-chosen goal contract than when they are
offered a simple piece rate contract that offers equal or lower earnings at any level of
production. This is the case despite the fact that women perform the task better than men
in the baseline LOPR condition, indicating that there is no gender bias in favor of men
in the task. Self-chosen goals, in contrast, are very effective for men, as they produce the
same output and effort than when they are offered high piece rate payments. The pattern
of performance of women that we observe, lower output at higher levels of compensation in
HIPR and GOAL relative to LOPR, is consistent with satisficing behavior with regard to
income or a backward-bending labor supply curve for labor reflecting strong income effects.
Women’s underperformance relative to men under a self-chosen goal contract is, at
least in part, explained by their failure to systematically update their goals upward to
reflect improving performance. Previous work has shown that women tend to shy away
from competitive challenges more than men (?). Here, we find that they also shy away
from challenging themselves. While the behavior of men is very consistent with our model’s
predictions, the results indicate that gender should be taken into account when an employer
is choosing how to incentivize employees.
A natural question to ask is how a self-chosen goal compares to a goal contract exoge-
nously chosen by the employer. The chief advantage of the self-chosen goal contract is that
it can exploit the private information that the employee has about his/her own ability, and
potentially align the incentives of employer and employee. On the other hand, an exogenous
goal set by an employer might be able to benefit from an additional motivating force for the
worker, the desire to reciprocate a generous wage offer chosen by an employer (Fehr et al.,
1998). This is an issue to be explored in future research.
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